Informed Bayesian t-Tests by Gronau, Q. F. (Quentin) et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=utas20
The American Statistician
ISSN: 0003-1305 (Print) 1537-2731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/utas20
Informed Bayesian t-Tests
Quentin F. Gronau, Alexander Ly & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers
To cite this article: Quentin F. Gronau, Alexander Ly & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers (2020) Informed
Bayesian t-Tests, The American Statistician, 74:2, 137-143, DOI: 10.1080/00031305.2018.1562983
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2018.1562983
© 2019 American Statistical Association
View supplementary material 
Accepted author version posted online: 25
Mar 2019.
Published online: 28 May 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 3754
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Citing articles: 9 View citing articles 
THE AMERICAN STATISTICIAN
2020, VOL. 74, NO. 2, 137–143: Statistical Practice
https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2018.1562983
Informed Bayesian t-Tests
Quentin F. Gronaua, Alexander Lya,b, and Eric-Jan Wagenmakersa
aDepartment of Psychological Methods, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; bCentrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Across the empirical sciences, few statistical procedures rival the popularity of the frequentist t-test. In
contrast, the Bayesian versions of the t-test have languished in obscurity. In recent years, however, the
theoretical and practical advantages of the Bayesian t-test have become increasingly apparent and various
Bayesian t-tests have been proposed, both objective ones (based on general desiderata) and subjective
ones (based on expert knowledge). Here, we propose a flexible t-prior for standardized effect size that
allows computation of the Bayes factor by evaluating a single numerical integral. This specification contains
previous objective and subjective t-test Bayes factors as special cases. Furthermore, we propose two
measures for informed prior distributions that quantify the departure from the objective Bayes factor
desiderata of predictive matching and information consistency. We illustrate the use of informed prior
distributions basedon an expert prior elicitation effort. Supplementarymaterials for this article are available
online.
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1. Introduction
The t-test is designed to assess whether or not two means differ.
The question is fundamental, and consequently the t-test has
grown to be an inferential workhorse of the empirical sciences.
The popularity of the t-test is underscored by considering the p-
values published in eight major psychology journals from 1985
until 2013 (Nuijten et al. 2016); out of a total of 258,105 p-values,
26% tested the significance of a t statistic. For comparison, 4%
of those p-values tested an r statistic, 4% a z statistic, 9% a χ2
statistic, and 57% an F statistic. Similarly, Wetzels et al. (2011)
found 855 t-tests reported in 252 psychology articles, for an
average of about 3.4 t-tests per article.
The two-sample t-test typically assumes that the data are
normally distributed with common standard deviation, that is,
Y1i ∼ N (μ + σδ2 , σ 2) and Y2j ∼ N (μ − σδ2 , σ 2) for i =
1, . . . , n1 and j = 1, . . . , n2. The parameter μ is interpreted
as a grand mean, σ as the common standard deviation, and δ
as the (standardized) effect size. A typical application involves
a treatment group and a control group and the task is to infer
whether or not the treatment has an effect. The null hypothesis
of the treatment not being effective corresponds toH0 : δ = 0
and implies that the population means of the two groups are the
same, while the two-sided alternative H1 allows the effect size
to vary freely, and implies that the population means of the two
groups differ.
This article concerns the Bayesian t-test originally devel-
oped by Jeffreys (1948) in the one-sample setting, and recently
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extended to the two-sample set-up by Gönen et al. (2005) and,
subsequently, Rouder et al. (2009). In his work on hypothesis
testing, Jeffreys focused on the Bayes factor (Etz and Wagen-
makers 2017; Kass and Raftery 1995; Ly, Verhagen, andWagen-
makers 2016a, 2016b; Robert, Chopin, and Rousseau 2009), the
predictive updating factor that quantifies the change in relative
beliefs about the hypothesesH1 andH0 based on observed data
d (Wrinch and Jeffreys 1921, p. 387):
P(H1 | d)
P(H0 | d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
= p(d |H1)
p(d |H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF10(d)
P(H1)
P(H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
. (1)
The Bayes factor is given by the ratio of themarginal likelihoods
of H1 and H0 that are obtained by integrating out the model
parameters with respect to the parameters’ prior distribution.
For the two-sample t-test, the null model H0 specifies two free
parameters ζ = (μ, σ), while the alternative has three, namely,
(ζ , δ) = (μ, σ , δ). Once the priors π0(ζ ) and π1(ζ , δ) are
specified, the parameters of each model can be integrated out
as follows
BF10(d) =
∫

∫
Z f (d | δ, ζ ,H1) π1(δ, ζ ) dζ dδ∫
Z f (d | ζ ,H0) π0(ζ ) dζ
. (2)
Equation (2) shows that the Bayes factor can be regarded as the
ratio of two weighted averages where the weights correspond
to the prior distribution for the parameters. Consequently, the
choice of the prior distributions is crucial for the development
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of a Bayes factor hypothesis test. Jeffreys (1961) elaborated
on various procedures to select priors for a Bayes factor and
the construction of his one-sample t-test became the norm in
objective Bayesian analysis (e.g., Bayarri et al. 2012; Berger and
Pericchi 2001; Liang et al. 2008). Jeffreys’s Bayes factor for the
two-sample t-test, however, was needlessly complicated and it
wasGönen et al. (2005)who provided the desired simplification.
The innovation of Gönen et al. (2005) was to reparameterize
the means of the two groups, μ1 and μ2, in terms of a grand
mean and the effect size, as was introduced at the start of this
section. Following Jeffreys, the second idea was to use a right
Haar prior π0(μ, σ) ∝ σ−1 on the nuisance parameters, the
parameters common to both the null and the alternative model
(Bayarri et al. 2012; Berger, Pericchi, and Varshavsky 1998;
Severini, Mukerjee, and Ghosh 2002). Using this prior choice,
the marginal likelihood of the null model—the denominator of
the Bayes factor BF10(d)—is proportional to the density of a
standard t-distribution evaluated at the observed t-value. The
third idea was to decompose the prior under the alternative
hypothesis into a product of the prior used under the null
hypothesis, and a test-relevant prior on the (standardized) effect
size, that is, π1(μ, σ , δ) = π0(μ, σ)π(δ). Finally, Gönen et al.
(2005) showed that a normal prior δ ∼ N (μδ , g) on the effect
size yields a Bayes factor for the two-sample t-test, that is, easily
calculated:
BF10(d;μδ , g) =
1√
1+nδg Tν(
t√
1+nδg ;
√
nδ
1+nδgμδ)
Tν(t)
, (3)
where 1bTν(
t
b ; a) denotes the density of a t-distribution with
ν degrees of freedom, noncentrality parameter a and scale
b, Tν(t) = Tν(t ; 0) denotes the density of a standard t-
distribution, and d refers to the data consisting of degrees
of freedom ν = n1 + n2 − 2, the observed t-value t =√
nδ(y¯1 − y¯2)/sp, where nδ = (1/n1 + 1/n2)−1 is the effective
sample size, and νs2p = (n1 − 1)s21 + (n2 − 1)s22 the pooled
sums of squares. In fact, the Bayes factors for the two-sample
t-test discussed here also cover the one-sample case, by (1)
replacing the effective sample size by the sample size n; (2)
replacing the degrees of freedom ν by n−1; and (3) replacing the
two-sample t-value by its one sample equivalent t = √ny¯/sy,
where νs2y =
∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2. This means that practitioners
who can calculate a classical t-test can also easily conduct
a Bayesian two-sample t-test: they only need to choose the
hyperparameter μδ corresponding to the effect size prior mean
and the hyperparameter g corresponding to the prior variance.
For brevity, we refer to the latter choice δ ∼ N (μδ , g) as a g-
prior on δ, since it resembles the priors Zellner (1986) proposed
in the regression framework. When μδ = 0, the normal g-
prior on δ translates to Zellner’s g-prior on the mean difference
(μ1 − μ2) ∼ N (0, gσ 2).
Later Bayes factors for the two-sample t-test proposed by
Rouder et al. (2009) and Wang and Liu (2016) retained the
first three ideas: the parameterization in terms of the grand
mean and effect size, the use of the right Haar prior on the
nuisance parameters π0(μ, σ) ∝ σ−1, and the decomposition
π1(μ, σ , δ) = π0(μ, σ)π(δ), but they differ in the choice
of the test relevant prior π(δ). Wang and Liu (2016) noted
that the Bayes factors of Gönen et al. (2005) are information
inconsistent, which implies that the Bayes factor in favor of the
alternative does not go to infinity when the observed t-value
increases indefinitely. To make the Bayes factor information
consistent, Wang and Liu (2016) instead proposed to assign g
a Pearson Type VI/beta prime hyper-prior distribution (see also
Maruyama and George 2011, for this proposal in the regression
context). Inspired by the developments of Liang et al. (2008)
in the regression framework, Rouder et al. (2009) proposed
to replace the normal prior on δ by a Cauchy prior π(δ) =
Cauchy (δ ; 0, γ ), a choice that resembles that of Jeffreys (1948)
proposition for the one-sample t-test with prior scale γ = 1.
In their response to Wang and Liu (2016), Gönen et al. (2019)
stressed the relevance of a subjective prior specification and
noted that the Bayes factors proposed by Rouder et al. (2009)
and Wang and Liu (2016) are not flexible enough to incor-
porate available expert knowledge, since these objective Bayes
factors are based on priors that are centered at zero. Here—
without taking sides in the discussion between objective and
subjective inference—wepresent a generalized formof theBayes
factor developed by Rouder et al. (2009) that allows the prior
specification to be informed by substantive domain knowledge.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the proposed Bayes factor and two measures for quan-
tifying the departure from Jeffreys’s desiderata of predictive
matching and information consistency. Section 3 demonstrates,
using a concrete example, how the proposed Bayes factor can
be used in practice to incorporate expert knowledge based
on a prior elicitation effort. The article ends with concluding
comments.
2. Theory
Weuse the framework of Gönen et al. (2005) and extend the pri-
ors proposed by Rouder et al. (2009) to allow formore informed
Bayesian t-tests. We exploit the fact that, with π0(μ, σ) ∝ σ−1,
the Bayes factor can be written as (a derivation is provided in the
online appendix, supplementary materials [Theorems A.1, A.2,
and the associated corollaries]):
BF10(d) =
∫
Tν(t |√nδδ)π(δ)dδ
Tν(t)
, (4)
where Tν(t | a) denotes the density of a t-distribution with ν
degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter a. The numer-
ator can be easily evaluated using numerical integration. Con-
sequently, Equation (4) shows that researchers can easily obtain
a Bayes factor based on any proper prior for the standardized
effect size δ by inserting the prior density of interest for π(δ).
We propose the use of a flexible t-prior for δ, that is, π(δ) =
1
γ
Tκ( δ−μδγ ), allowing practitioners to incorporate expert knowl-
edge about standardized effect size by specifying a location
hyperparameter μδ , a scale hyperparameter γ , and a degrees
of freedom hyperparameter κ . The resulting Bayes factor is
given by:
BF10(d;μδ , γ , κ) =
∫
Tν(t |√nδδ) 1γ Tκ ( δ−μδγ )dδ
Tν(t)
, (5)
where the integral in the numerator can be easily calculated
using free software packages such as R (R Core Team 2016).
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We believe that the proposed Bayes factor based on a t-prior for
effect size has a number of advantages. First, similar to the Bayes
factor proposed by Gönen et al. (2005)—which is a special case
obtained by taking γ = √g and κ → ∞– it allows researchers,
if desired, to incorporate existing expert knowledge about effect
size into the prior specification furthering cumulative scientific
learning. Second, this class of priors contains theCauchy prior of
Rouder et al. (2009) as a special case (obtained by setting κ = 1,
μδ = 0). Therefore, using the same expression, researchers
can incorporate expert prior knowledge or they can use an
objective default prior. Third, this set-up allows researchers to
quantify the departure from Jeffreys’s predictive matching and
information consistency desiderata based on departure mea-
sures proposed below. This enables a more formal assessment
of differences between objective and subjective prior choices
and may benefit the dialog between objective and subjective
Bayesians (see, e.g., Wang and Liu 2016; Gönen et al. 2019).
2.1. TwoMeasures for the Departure From Jeffreys’s
Desiderata
2.1.1. PredictiveMatching
Jeffreys considered two desiderata for prior choice. The first
desideratum, predictive matching, states that the Bayes factor
should be perfectly indifferent (i.e., BF10(d) = 1) in case
the data are completely uninformative. Recall that the alterna-
tive model has three free parameters; it is therefore natural to
require at least three observations before conclusions can be
drawn. Consequently, Jeffreys required a Bayes factor of 1 for
any dataset of size smaller or equal to 2, thus, for ν = 0.
As apparent from Equation (1), this requirement guarantees
the posterior model odds to be the same as the prior model
odds for completely uninformative datasets. For instance, the
dataset dν<min consisting of only one observation in each group
n1 = n2 = 1 automatically has zero sums of squares, that
is, νs2p = 0. If y¯1 = y¯2 the associated t-value would then
be unbounded. Let f (d | δ) denote the reduced likelihood (i.e.,
the likelihood with the nuisance parameters integrated out):
f (d | δ) = ∫ ∫ f (d |μ, σ , δ)σ−1dμdσ . Using a lemma dis-
tilled from the Bateman project (Bateman et al. 1954, 1953; Ly,
Marsman, andWagenmakers 2018), straightforward but tedious
computations show that f (d | δ) is proportional to the density
of a t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom and noncentrality
parameter √nδδ (see Theorem A.2 in the online appendix,
supplementary materials for details). To convey that nothing is
learned from the dataset dν<min, Jeffreys chose π(δ) such that
p(dν<min |H0) = p(dν<min |H1) =
∫
f (dν<min | δ)π(δ)dδ.
(6)
As νs2p = 0, nδ = 1/2, and y¯1 = y¯2, we obtain
(2|y¯1 − y¯2|)−1 =
∫
(2|y¯1 − y¯2|)−1
×[1 + sign(y¯1 − y¯2)Erf( δ2 )]π(δ)dδ, (7)
where sign(z) is one when z is positive, minus one when z is
negative, and zero otherwise (see Corollaries A.1.3 and A.2.1
in the online appendix, supplementary materials). Erf(z) =
2√
π
∫ z
0 e
−u2du is the error function, an odd function of z. Note
that the requirement Equation (7) is fulfilled if a proper symmet-
ric prior is used for δ. Based on Equation (7) we define the (two-
sided) departure of any proper prior with respect to Jeffreys’s
predictive matching criterion as
D(π , Pred | dν<min) =
∫
sign(y¯1 − y¯2)Erf( δ2 )π(δ)dδ, (8)
and note that BF10(dν<min) = 1 + D(π , Pred | dν<min). For
instance, a t-prior located at μδ = 0.350, with scale γ = 0.102
and κ = 3 degrees of freedom, as used later on in the example,
has a departure of the predictive matching criterion of 0.0198
when y¯1 > y¯2. In other words, for completely uninformative
datasets with y¯1 < y¯2 the Bayes factor will be BF10(dν<min) ≈
0.98, while if y¯1 > y¯2 the Bayes factor would be BF10(dν<min) ≈
1.02, instead.
2.1.2. Information Consistency
The second desideratum, information consistency, states that the
Bayes factor should provide infinite support for the alternative
in case the data are overwhelmingly informative (Bayarri et al.
2012; Jeffreys 1942). An overwhelmingly informative dataset for
the two-sample t-test is denoted by dinfo,ν with ν ≥ 1, effective
sample size nδ > 1/2 (this condition implies that there is at
least one observation per group), a (pooled) sums of squares
νs2p = 0, and an observed mean difference y¯1 − y¯2 = 0, thus,
an unbounded t-value. For such an overwhelmingly informative
dataset dinfo,ν to provide infinite support for the alternative,
Jeffreys required that p(dinfo,ν |H0) is bounded and that π(δ) is
chosen such that
∫
f (dinfo,ν | δ)π(δ)dδ diverges. With νs2p = 0
and y¯1 = y¯2 the marginal likelihood of the null model becomes
p(dinfo,ν |H0) =
(ν+12 )
2π
ν+1
2
√
ν + 2
(
nδ(y¯1 − y¯2)2
)− ν+12 , (9)
which is indeed bounded (see Corollary A.1.3 in the online
appendix, supplementary materials). In Corollary A.2.2 of the
online appendix (supplementary materials) it is shown that for
δ large, the reduced likelihood f (dinfo,ν | δ)with νs2p = 0 behaves
like a polynomial with leading order ν, that is,
f (dinfo,ν | δ) ∼ δν . (10)
To guarantee for degrees of freedom ν that
∫
f (dinfo,ν | δ)π(δ)dδ
diverges, it suffices to take a prior that does not have the νth
moment. As information consistency should hold for all ν ≥ 1,
this implies that π(δ) should be chosen such that it does not
have a first moment. Based on the condition that the marginal
likelihood should already diverge for ν = 1, we define the
departure of Jeffreys’s information consistency criterion as
D(π , InfoConsist)
= argmin
{
ν ∈ N :
∫
f (dinfo,ν | δ)π(δ)dδ ∈ R
}
− 1.
(11)
If π(δ) is taken to be a t-prior with κ degrees of freedom the
departure from Jeffreys’s information consistency criterion is
κ − 1, since a t-distribution has κ − 1 moments. For instance,
a t-prior with κ = 3 degrees of freedom has only two moments
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and, therefore, misses the information consistency by two sam-
ples. This means that the Bayes factor only goes to infinity
for overwhelmingly informative data when ν ≥ 3. Therefore,
an informed t-prior with degrees of freedom larger than one
requires more observations to be “convinced” by the data than
does an objective prior with degrees of freedom equal to 1.
2.1.3. Practical Value of the Proposed Departure
Measures
The departure measures introduced above can be used to issue
recommendations for researchers whowould like to incorporate
expert knowledge into the prior specification, but would also
like to retain Jeffreys’s desiderata as much as possible. For the
proposed t-prior, we recommend that researchers who would
like to retain information consistency choose κ ∈ (0, 1]. For
instance, setting κ = 1 results in a Cauchy prior. Note that,
crucially, information consistency still holds if this Cauchy prior
is centered on a value other than zero which enables one to
incorporate expert knowledge about effect size by shifting the
prior away from zero. Researchers who want to retain predictive
matching should specify the prior to be centered on zero (i.e.,
μδ = 0); however, the scale parameter γ and the degrees of
freedom κ can be chosen freely. Next, we demonstrate with an
example how the proposed Bayes factor can be used in practice.
The example features a prior elicitation effort (e.g., Kadane and
Wolfson 1998) highlighting the practical feasibility of specifying
an informed prior based on expert knowledge.
3. Practice
The facial feedback hypothesis states that affective responses can
be influenced by one’s facial expression even when that facial
expression is not the result of an emotional experience. In a
seminal study, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) found that
participants who held a pen between their teeth (inducing a
facial expression similar to a smile) rated cartoons as more
funny on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 9 than
participants who held a pen with their lips (inducing a facial
expression similar to a pout).
In a recently published Registered Replication Report
(Wagenmakers et al. 2016), 17 labs worldwide attempted
to replicate this finding using a preregistered and indepen-
dently vetted protocol. A classical random-effects meta-analysis
yielded an estimate of the mean difference between the “smile”
and “pout” condition equal to 0.03 [95% CI: −0.11, 0.16]. Fur-
thermore, one-sided default Bayesian unpaired t-tests (using
a zero-centered Cauchy prior with scale 1/
√
2 for effect size,
the current standard in the field of psychology; see Morey and
Rouder 2015) revealed that for all 17 studies, the Bayes factor
indicated evidence in favor of the null hypothesis and for 13
out of the 17 studies, the Bayes factor in favor of the null was
larger than 3. Overall, the authors concluded that “the results
were inconsistent with the original result” (Wagenmakers et al.
2016, p. 924).
Here, we present an informed reanalysis of the data of one of
the labs based on a prior elicitation effortwithDr. SuzanneOost-
erwijk, a social psychologist at the University of Amsterdam
with considerable expertise in this domain. The results for the
other labs can be found in online appendix C (supplementary
materials).
3.1. Prior Elicitation
Before commencing the elicitation process, we asked our expert
to ignore the knowledge about the failed replication of Strack,
Martin, and Stepper (1988). Next, we stressed that the goal of the
elicitation effort was to obtain an informed prior distribution for
δ under the alternative hypothesisH1, that is, under the assump-
tion that the effect is present. This was important to prevent
unwittingly eliciting a prior, that is, a mixture between a point
mass at zero and the distribution of interest. Then, we proceeded
in steps of increasing sophistication. First, together with the
expert we decided that the theory specified a direction, implying
a one-sided hypothesis test. Next, we asked the expert to provide
a value for the median of the effect size: this yielded a value of
0.35. Subsequently, we asked for values for the 33% and 66%
percentile of the prior distribution for the effect size: this yielded
values of 33%-tile = 0.25 and 66%-tile = 0.45. To finesse and
validate the specified prior distribution we used the MATCH
Uncertainty ElicitationTool (http://optics.eee.nottingham.ac.uk/
match/uncertainty.php; see also online appendix B, supplemen-
tary materials), a web application that allows one to elicit prob-
ability distributions from experts (Morris, Oakley, and Crowe
2014). Furthermore, we used R’s (R Core Team 2016) plotting
capabilities for eliciting the prior number of degrees of freedom.
The complete elicitation effort took approximately one hour and
resulted in a t-distribution with location 0.350, scale 0.102, and
3 degrees of freedom. As shown in the theory part, this prior
choice has a departure from the predictive matching criterion
of±0.0198 andmisses information consistency by two samples.
It should be emphasized, however, that the goal of this prior
elicitation was to construct a prior that truly reflects the expert’s
knowledge without being constrained by considerations about
Bayes factor desiderata. Alternatively, in an elicitation effort that
putsmore emphasis on these desiderata, one could, for instance,
fix the degrees of freedom to one and let the expert only choose
the location and scale.
3.2. Reanalysis of the Oosterwijk Replication Study
Having elicited an informed prior distribution for δ under the
alternative hypothesis, we now turn to a detailed reanalysis of
the facial feedback replication attempt from Dr. Oosterwijk’s
lab at the University of Amsterdam. This dataset features 53
participants in the “smile” condition with an average funniness
rating of 4.63 (SD = 1.48), and 57 participants in the “pout”
condition with an average funniness rating of 4.87 (SD =1.32);
consequently, the observed t-statistic is t(108) = −0.90.
The alternative hypothesis is directional, that is, the teeth
condition is predicted to result in relatively high funniness
ratings, not relatively low funniness ratings. To respect the
directional nature of the alternative hypothesis the two-sided
informed t-test outlined above requires an adjustment. Specif-
ically, the Bayes factor that compares an alternative hypothesis
that only allows for positive effect size values to the null hypoth-
esis can be computed via a simply identity that exploits the
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transitive nature of the Bayes factor (Morey and Wagenmakers
2014):
BF+0(d) = p(d |H+)p(d |H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF+1(d)
p(d |H1)
p(d |H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
BF10(d)
= BF+1(d)BF10(d). (12)
We already showed how to obtain BF10(d), that is, the Bayes
factor for the two-sided test of an informed alternative hypoth-
esis; the correction term BF+1(d) can be obtained by simply
dividing the posterior mass for δ larger than zero by the prior
mass for δ larger than zero. The expression for the marginal
posterior distribution for δ is provided in Corollary A.2.3 in the
online appendix (supplementary materials). Using this expres-
sion, numerical integration can be used to obtain the desired
posterior mass. The Bayes factor hypothesis test that we report
will respect the directional nature of the facial feedback hypoth-
esis and include the correction term from Equation (12).
Figure 1 shows the results of the reanalysis of the data
from the Oosterwijk lab. The displayed prior and posterior
distribution do not impose the directional constraint. The
one-sided Bayes factor based on the informed prior equals
BF0+(d; 0.350, 0.102, 3) = 11.5, indicating that the data are
about twelve times more likely under the null hypothesis than
under the one-sided alternative hypothesis.
For comparison, Figure 2 displays the results based on
the default one-sided zero-centered Cauchy distribution
with scale 1/
√
2. The one-sided default Bayes factor equals
BF0+(d; 0, 1/
√
2, 1) = 8.7, indicating that the data are about
9 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under
the one-sided default alternative hypothesis. Hence, both the
informed and the default Bayes factor yield the same qualitative
conclusion, that is, evidence for the null hypothesis. However,
the unrestricted posterior distributions differ noticeably
between the informed and the default analysis: the posterior
median based on the informed prior specification is positive and
equal to 0.153 (95% credible interval: [−0.264, 0.390]) whereas
Figure 1. Results of an informed reanalysis of the facial feedback hypothesis
replication data from the Oosterwijk lab. The dotted line corresponds to the
elicited 10.102 T3
(
δ−0.350
0.102
)
prior distribution. The solid line corresponds to the
associated posterior distribution, with a 95% credible interval and the posterior
median displayed on top. The Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis over
the one-sided informed alternative hypothesis equals BF0+(d; 0.350, 0.102, 3) =
11.5. Figure available at https://tinyurl.com/mk7uaxm under CC license https://
creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/2.0/ .
Figure 2. Results of the default analysis of the facial feedback hypothesis repli-
cation data from the Oosterwijk lab. The dotted line corresponds to the default
Cauchy prior distribution with scale parameter 1/
√
2. The solid line corresponds to
the associated posterior distribution, with a 95% credible interval and the posterior
median displayed on top. The Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis over the
one-sided default alternative hypothesis equals BF0+(d; 0, 1/
√
2, 1) = 8.7. Figure
available at https://tinyurl.com/mgs28ob under CC license https://creativecommons.
org/ licenses/by/2.0/ .
the posterior median based on the default prior distribution is
equal to −0.152 (95% credible interval: [−0.511, 0.200]).
4. Concluding Comments
The comparison between two means is a quintessential infer-
ence problem. Originally developed by Jeffreys (1948) in
the one-sample setting, the Bayesian t-test has recently been
extended to the two-sample set-up by Gönen et al. (2005) and,
subsequently, by Rouder et al. (2009) andWang and Liu (2016).
Here, we showed that practitioners can easily and intuitively
use a generalized version of the Bayes factor by Rouder et al.
(2009) to inform their two-sample Bayesian t-tests. We used
the framework of Gönen et al. (2005) and extended the priors
by Rouder et al. (2009) to allow for more informed Bayesian t-
tests that can incorporate expert knowledge by using a flexible
t-prior. An advantage of the flexible t-prior is that it contains
the objective default prior by Rouder et al. (2009) as a special
case and the subjective prior proposed by Gönen et al. (2005)
as a limiting case. Therefore, practitioners can use the same
formula to compute subjective and objective Bayesian t-tests. To
encourage its adoption in applied work, we have implemented
the proposedBayesian t-test set-up in the open-source statistical
programJASP (JASP Team 2018, jasp-stats.org). In the theoret-
ical part of this article, we investigated theoretical properties of
the informed t-prior. Specifically, we discussed popular Bayes
factor desiderata and proposed measures to quantify the devia-
tion of an informed t-test from its objective counterpart. In the
practical part of the article, we illustrated the use of the informed
Bayes factor with an example. Similar to the prior proposed by
Gönen et al. (2005), the flexible t-priormay encourage the use of
prior distributions that better represent the predictions from the
hypothesis under test, allowingmoremeaningful conclusions to
be drawn from the same data (Rouder et al. 2016a, 2016b).
Other choices than a t-prior for effect size are conceivable.
Equation (3) shows that one can obtain a Bayes factor for
any scale-mixture of normals by integrating Equation (3) with
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respect to a prior on g (see TheoremA.3 in the online appendix,
supplementary materials; for possible choices see, e.g., Liang
et al. 2008 and Bayarri et al. 2012). This also includes the prior
proposed by Wang and Liu (2016) and highlights that it is
straightforward to extend this prior to include a location param-
eter that can be specified based on expert knowledge. In fact, the
expressions for the Bayes factor that we presented make it rela-
tively straightforward to use any proper prior on standardized
effect size (see Equation (4)). The proposed departure measures
can then be used to investigate information consistency and
predictive matching for different choices.
In this article, we focused on the Bayes factor as the infer-
ential tool for quantifying the relative evidence for competing
hypotheses based on observed data. However, it could be argued
that a complete Bayesian analysis requires one to also specify
the prior plausibilities of the competing hypotheses. This is of
particular importance in situations where unlikely hypotheses
are tested or when multiple comparisons are considered (Scott
and Berger 2010). Although specifying the prior plausibilities of
the competing hypotheses may not be trivial, once this has been
achieved, the Bayes factor can be simply multiplied by the prior
odds to obtain the posterior odds of interest.
Supplementary Materials
Online Appendix: Informed Bayesian t-Tests: Derivations, details about
prior elicitation, and additional analyses. (pdf)
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